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Abstract 
This paper contributes to research on control in multinational enterprises 
(MNEs) by considering the case of global professional service firms (GPSFs). 
Drawing on fieldwork in four firms, it argues that GPSFs are seeking greater 
control over their subsidiaries in order to provide integrated cross-national 
services to global clients and, in the process, are becoming subject to a center-
subsidiary tension similar to that observed in more conventional MNEs. 
However, and importantly, the paper also argues that the center-subsidiary 
tension operates differently in GPSFs. This is because central control in this 
particular context is pursued by not only headquarters but also subsidiaries 
based in core economies where major global clients are headquartered. Such 
polycentric control leads to the center-subsidiary tension expressing itself 
along not just the vertical (headquarters-subsidiary) axis but also the 
horizontal (inter-subsidiary) one and, in particular, along core-periphery lines. 
The research and managerial implications of these findings are discussed.  
 
 
Keywords: Headquarters-subsidiary relations, Control and coordination, 
Multinational enterprises, Professional service firms, Core-periphery relations  
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1. Introduction  
In the last three decades, a considerable body of research has examined how 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) control their international operations. Much 
of this work has adopted the perspective of headquarters and been concerned 
with identifying and prescribing effective ways of controlling subsidiaries (e.g. 
Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997). Since the early 2000s, 
however, a growing body of research has been undertaken from the viewpoint 
of subsidiaries, revealing how the interests, practices and contextual 
circumstances of these actors often undercut central control efforts (e.g. 
Birkinshaw et al., 2000; Ferner, 2000). This has gradually led to a view of the 
MNE as a socio-political space marked by a fundamental center-subsidiary 
tension over control processes and opened up a lively discussion about the 
causes, consequences and moderating factors of this tension (see e.g. 
contributions in Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2011; Ferner et al., 2006). 
 
In this paper, we reflect on a category of MNEs that have been largely left 
out of the discussion: global professional service firms (GPSFs) – of which the 
‘Big Four’ accountancies, the ‘elite’ law firms and the major international 
management consultancies are prime examples. These organizations now 
occupy center stage in the world economy in terms of their influence, role and 
size, and this very fact ‘is reason enough for giving them serious attention’ 
(Suddaby et al., 2008, p.  992). More importantly, control in GPSFs tends to 
be highly decentralized (Jones, 2005; Nachum, 2003), raising the question of 
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whether the center-subsidiary framework of analysis that lies at the heart of 
the socio-political view of the MNE is useful in this context.  
 
We address this question through qualitative research conducted in the 
consulting arms of four of the world’s largest GPSFs, from the perspective of 
their UK (London) subsidiaries. We focus, in particular, on control processes 
related to the delivery of transnational projects on behalf of global clients. We 
begin by elaborating on the theoretical context of the study, reviewing first the 
literature on center-subsidiary control relations in MNEs and, subsequently, 
research on the international organization of GPSFs. We then describe our 
research methods and, in a subsequent section, present our findings. We show 
how GPSFs are becoming subject to a center-subsidiary tension similar to that 
observed in conventional MNEs but also reveal that this tension manifests 
itself differently in this particular context. In the final section, we discuss the 
research and managerial implications of the findings, and highlight a few 
limitations together with some possible areas for future research.  
 
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Control in MNEs 
A key message to emerge from headquarters-oriented studies of MNE control 
(e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989; Nohria & Ghoshal, 1997) is that MNEs have 
become less centrally managed. That is, in response to the increasing 
complexity of the international business environment, including pressures for 
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more responsiveness and innovation, MNEs have had to shed their command-
and-control structures and give subsidiaries more autonomy. In particular, 
MNEs are said to have become less reliant on conventional – i.e. 
‘bureaucratic’ – means of controlling subsidiaries (e.g. formal hierarchy, 
standardized work procedures and formal performance management systems). 
Instead, they seek to maintain firm-wide control through ‘cultural’ means (e.g. 
training and socialization), i.e. by having subsidiary managers internalize, and 
therefore willingly comply with, central requirements.  
 
However, this view of MNE control has been challenged by research 
conducted from the perspective of subsidiaries (e.g. Birkinshaw et al., 2000; 
Ferner, 2000; also contributions in Morgan et al., 2001). This has revealed 
that, in practice, central control is ‘greater than is often thought’ (Edwards et 
al., 1996, p. 20) and that, indeed, ‘the relative importance of headquarters is in 
fact growing’ (Barner-Rasmussen et al., 2010, p. 88; see also Yamin & 
Forsgren, 2006). This appears to be especially the case in service MNEs 
attempting to respond to global customers’ demand for integrated cross-
national offerings (Miozzo & Yamin, 2012). It has also been highlighted that 
‘cultural’ control efforts are merely an additional means by which the center 
seeks to regulate subsidiaries rather than an alternative to conventional 
‘bureaucratic’ forms of management (Ferner, 2000).  
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This is not to imply that central control is always effective. On the 
contrary, it is often challenging because the interests and practices of the two 
parties are frequently misaligned. That is, headquarters pursues global control 
– often by simply imposing home-centric management systems and practices 
with little subsidiary involvement and scant attention to host-country contexts 
– but subsidiaries do not necessarily fulfill expectations and may indeed be 
directly opposed to ‘top-down’ management. Such resistance occurs not 
simply due to subsidiary managers being ‘intrinsically motivated by […] the 
need for self-determination or autonomy’ (Ambos et al., 2010, p. 1102) but 
also because host-country institutional pressures can lead them into seeing the 
requirements and control systems of headquarters as inappropriate for, or 
inefficient in, their local contexts (see e.g. Ferner et al., 2001). The result is 
that central control efforts sometimes fail or have to be negotiated through the 
deployment of power resources held by the two parties.  
 
In sum, the MNE is increasingly being conceptualized as a ‘contested 
terrain’, i.e. a socio-political space in which headquarters and subsidiaries are 
continually engaged in conflict and negotiation over the control of the firm 
and its resources (see e.g. Andersson et al., 2007; Morgan & Kristensen, 2006; 
also contributions in Dörrenbächer & Geppert, 2011; Ferner at el., 2006). This 
socio-political perspective has greatly advanced our empirical and conceptual 
understanding of control in the contemporary MNE. What remains unclear, 
however, is whether this perspective, which has emerged based on studies of 
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manufacturing MNEs, is useful for understanding control in GPSFs, 
organizations that are generally believed to be highly decentralized.  
 
2.2. Control in GPSFs 
It is well established that professional service firms, because of their 
‘professional’ character, tend to be more decentralized than conventional 
businesses such as manufacturing companies (see e.g. Greenwood et al., 1990; 
Mintzberg, 1983). Unlike most manufactured goods, professional services are 
typically produced in close interaction with clients who often require 
customized solutions, thereby calling for a mode of control that gives 
professionals a high degree of autonomy in their day-to-day activities. Further, 
norms of professionalism generally dictate that decisions about the 
management and organization of the firm are made consensually rather than in 
a ‘top-down’ fashion. In short, as Mintzberg (1983, p. 197) long ago put it, 
‘not only do […] professionals control their own work, but they also seek 
collective control of the administrative decisions that affect them.’ 
 
Central control in professional service firms is thus relatively limited and 
the same appears to apply to those firms that are transnational in scope (see 
e.g. Aharoni, 1996; Jones, 2005; Nachum, 2003). Indeed, the transnational 
level arguably calls for an even greater degree of decentralization given that 
professionals here not only have to offer customized client solutions but also 
‘tailor offerings to suit local market preferences and culture’ (Campbell & 
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Verbeke, 1994, p. 97). In this context, subsidiaries are said to retain firm 
control over decisions about day-to-day work matters (e.g. the allocation of 
employees to client projects and the choice of methods of work and service 
delivery) and also have a degree of control over managerial decisions affecting 
them via consensual-decision making processes. Whilst ‘bureaucratic’ control 
systems are by no means absent (e.g. global HRM policies and knowledge 
management systems), central control is said to generally occur more through 
‘cultural’ means, including shared training (to standardize the skills of 
professionals) and socialization practices (to inculcate appropriate 
organizational values). In other words, day-to-day professional practice tends 
to be highly decentralized whilst a degree of central control occurs over 
professional standards, work methods and people management practices 
through firm-wide systems and policies.
i
  
 
This raises the question of whether and how far the sociopolitical view of 
the MNE is useful for understanding GPSFs. Based on the characteristics 
discussed above, one would be inclined to conclude that it is not. However, a 
common theme running through the professional services literature is that 
demand for integrated cross-national solutions on the part of ‘global clients’ 
has led GPSFs across various sectors to become more centrally managed (see 
e.g. Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2008; Fenton & Pettigrew, 2003; also Kärreman 
& Alvesson, 2004). The organizational implications of this change are far 
from clear given the dearth of detailed research conducted from a subsidiary 
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perspective, but it suggests that GPSFs are becoming less distinctive and 
therefore possibly subject to a center-subsidiary tension similar to that 
observed in conventional MNEs. Indeed, a number of studies point in that 
direction (Author, 2009; Barrett et al., 2005; Muzio & Faulconbridge, 2013).  
 
A few studies seem to suggest otherwise, however. For instance, Spence 
et al.’s research (in press) on the ‘Big Four’ accounting firms identifies a 
strong center-subsidiary convergence around partner promotion processes and, 
in particular, around the need to generate certain levels of revenue as an 
essential criterion for promotion. The authors argue that this suggests that the 
firms have become ‘in fundamental ways, globally homogenous’ (p. 18) and 
explain this development by highlighting, among other factors, considerable 
investment by the firms in the ‘standardization of knowledge sharing, training 
and service delivery’ (p. 19) over the last twenty years (see also Greenwood et 
al., 2010; Segal-Horn & Dean, 2009). The authors also point to the dominance 
of Anglo-American norms and values, especially a logic in which the profit 
motive is paramount in organizing the firm.  
 
How, then, should control in GPSFs be understood? Are these firms 
different from, and therefore less subject to the center-subsidiary tension 
observed in, conventional MNEs? Or are they becoming less distinctive due to 
client demand for integrated cross-national services and, hence, also subject to 
a fundamental center-subsidiary tension? Put differently, is the socio-political 
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view of the MNE an appropriate means by which to approach and understand 
control in GPSFs or do these organizations require an entirely new framework 
of analysis? The next section describes the methodology employed to shed 
light on these questions. 
 
3. Methods 
This paper is based on data drawn from a larger study exploring the 
globalization of PSFs and its organizations implications (see Author, 2009, for 
one aspect of this research). The study was conducted into four comparable 
GPSFs, from the perspective of their UK (London) subsidiaries. Two of the 
firms were publically-listed corporations of American origin; one corporation 
of continental-European origin, albeit with a significant US participation due 
to the firm’s merger with a major American firm in the 2000s; and one US-
driven network of locally-owned independent partnerships.
ii
 Each of the four 
firms employed thousands of professionals in hundreds of offices spread 
across the globe and each was multidisciplinary, offering a range of services 
including management consulting, IT consulting and outsourcing services. 
One of the firms also offered financial advisory services.  
 
The part of the research on which this paper is based focused on how the 
firms delivered integrated cross-national services, an area of activity that 
remains largely unexplored even though, as noted above, it is seen to be the 
key reason behind the observed increase in central control in GSPFs. The bulk 
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of the data was collected through seventy two face-to-face, digitally recorded 
interviews with professionals working in the management/IT consulting arms 
of the four firms. Sixty one interviews took place over a period of ten months 
in 2006. A further eleven interviews were conducted in the same firms in 
2010-2011 as part of on-going research into GPSFs. In addition, information 
drawn from the firms’ websites, annual reviews and other publicity material 
was obtained (these sources are not quoted in order to preserve the firms’ 
anonymity). The interviews were semi-structured and lasted between 45 
minutes and 1½ hours. They were conducted with professionals at multiple 
career levels – Consultant, Senior Consultant, Manager, Senior Manager, 
Associate Partner and Partner – in order to avoid privileging the senior 
managerial discourse of the ‘integrated global firm’ that runs through much of 
the MNE literature (e.g. Bartlett & Ghoshal, 1989) and writings on GPSFs 
more specifically (e.g. Rose & Hinings, 1999). All of the interviewees were or 
had been involved in the management and/or delivery of cross-national services 
and were thus able to inform us about the phenomenon under investigation.  
 
The data was analyzed in three stages. In the first stage, we transcribed the 
interviews verbatim and read the transcripts to get a ‘feel’ for this empirical 
material. In the second stage, we entered the transcripts into the qualitative 
data management software package QSR NVivo® and indexed them by case, 
by interview number, and by career level. Combining  ‘induction’ with 
‘deduction’ (Langley, 1999), we then coded each transcript according to pre-
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defined themes established in our literature review (e.g. central control, local 
autonomy, center-subsidiary convergence and divergence) and open-ended 
categories emerging inductively from the empirical material (e.g. inconsistent 
service standards and conflicting economic interests – see below). We coded 
the transcripts for each firm separately and then conducted cross-case analyses 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) in order to examine similarities and differences between the 
four organizations. This allowed us to isolate themes that were common across 
the cases from those that were idiosyncratic to a single case. In line with our 
multi-level interviewing approach, we were also attentive to the different 
meanings that consultants at different career levels ascribed to their 
experiences. In particular, we were careful to differentiate between statements 
reinforcing the view of the GPSF as an ‘integrated’ structure and those 
highlighting increased central control and center-subsidiary misalignments. In 
the third and final stage, through multiple iterations between the 1
st
 order 
themes, 2
nd
 order themes and pre-existing theory, we generated a set of two 
overarching themes – polycentric control and horizontal misalignments – that, 
taken together, formed what we considered to be ‘the “strongest” or most 
interesting interpretation’ (Alvesson, 2003, p. 25) of  our findings.  
 
Applying criteria of ‘trustworthiness’ (Lincoln & Guba, 1985) to ensure 
that the account provided is as consistent as possible with the experiences of 
the research participants, we make extensive use of quotations drawn from the 
interview transcripts. For confidentiality reasons, all identifying information is 
Control in the multinational enterprise 
 
13 
 
disguised: the four firms are referred to as A-Consulting, B-Consulting, C-
Consulting and D-Consulting and each research participant is identified as A1 
to A18 (in the case of A-Consulting), B1 to B18 (B-Consulting), C1 to C18 
(C-Consulting) and D1 to D18 (D-Consulting). 
 
4. Findings 
The firms in which this study was conducted targeted and provided support to 
many Fortune Global 500 companies. The interviewees reported that these 
large multinational corporations were continuing their international 
investments, building more complex cross-border supply chains and 
continually seeking to better integrate their geographically dispersed 
operations. These various international activities created a huge demand for 
consulting services around the world and, in particular, gave rise to a 
multitude of transnational client engagements, i.e. cross-national projects 
involving multiple global-client subsidiaries.  
 
To manage and deliver projects such as these, the firms deployed 
transnational teams, which typically comprised of a core group of consultants 
based in the client’s home country and a number of satellite teams located 
overseas (cf. Barrett et al., 2005). Leading such teams were ‘global client 
service partners’ (hereafter, ‘global partners’) whose responsibility was to 
manage client relationships and ensure effective service delivery on a cross-
national basis. In addition to stressing the strategic importance of global 
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clients through, for instance, mission statements and annual reviews, the firms 
invested heavily in the development of ‘global’ work methods and service 
standards to ensure task coordination and quality consistency across countries. 
They diffused such methods/standards through training programs, knowledge 
management systems and, indirectly, inter-office staff transfers.  
 
How did the UK (London) subsidiary actors in the firms under study 
experience this transnational team system as a control mechanism? Two 
overarching themes emerged from the analysis of their accounts: (1) 
polycentric control and (2) horizontal misalignments. We unpack these in turn. 
 
4.1. Polycentric control 
Several of the interviewees acknowledged that the transnational team system 
described above was an on-going process and one that was always subject to a 
degree of center-subsidiary misalignment. One key problem was that satellite 
teams were perceived to not always be working to ‘global’ standards, 
something which clients were becoming increasingly aware of and unwilling 
to accept. As a result, the firms were increasingly seeking to gain greater 
control over the work performed by their subsidiaries and, in so doing, 
becoming more centralized. For instance, an associate partner at A-Consulting 
explained that his firm was:  
… very rapidly moving from what was once a partnership to a corporate, 
centralized, command-and-control corporation. [City X] in [A-
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Consulting] is like the Borg.
iii
 Over the last few years, it’s become much 
more American centric and even though there are a large number of Brits 
in leadership positions, it’s much more American-centric. (A6) 
 
Such a shift towards more central control was being achieved in a variety 
of different ways and through not only ‘cultural’ means (e.g. increased 
communication and training) but also ‘bureaucratic’ ones. For instance, the 
firms introduced regional headquarters (e.g. UK & Ireland, Eastern Europe, 
Latin America), grouping geographically and culturally proximate offices 
under the leadership of a major subsidiary in the region. This was 
accompanied with new regional roles (e.g. EMEA leader) as well as a growing 
degree of control over the day-to-day activities of subsidiary consultants 
through frequent contacts and regular overseas visits during the delivery of 
cross-national services.  
 
However, these developments were by no means proving entirely 
effective and they also generated a degree of subsidiary resistance. For 
instance, the interviewees explained that the so-called ‘global’ methods and 
standards often meant ‘American’ methods and standards and that such US 
centrism inevitably led to a degree of contestation at the local level. An 
Associate Partner at D-Consulting who had also previously worked for A-
Consulting set out the problem as follows: 
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American-run firms like [A-Consulting] and [D-Consulting] find it very 
difficult to cope with other cultures because they are so universalistic; 
they believe so much that there is a global set of rules which applies 
everywhere… They find it very difficult to cope with the French, with the 
Far East, even at times with people like the Danes and Dutch. So the 
Americans impose structures on the rest of the firm but the other countries 
will contest that. (D4)  
 
Interestingly, however, the interviewees tended to discuss the observed 
center-subsidiary tension in a rather general sense, as a problem that affected 
other subsidiary actors, not themselves. This may have partly been due to the 
cultural and linguistic proximity between the US and the UK; indeed, such 
proximities were highlighted by a number of interviewees. What came out 
most strongly of the interviews, however, is a rather surprising and unexpected 
finding: the UK subsidiaries were themselves driving global control efforts 
within the four firms. They, for instance, contributed directly to the 
development of ‘global’ methods and standards (in collaboration with 
headquarters and other major Western offices) and also invested time and 
effort in delivering firm-wide training aimed at diffusing such 
methods/standards throughout the organization.  
 
Key to understanding this phenomenon is that the UK subsidiaries 
themselves had transnational projects to manage. Here, it is necessary to 
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appreciate how such projects were developed. The interviews revealed that 
these always came into being through symbiotic relationships between client 
MNE headquarters and partners based in the countries in which the former 
were located, i.e. ‘home-country’ partners. Thus, a British MNE with a 
transnational project would always approach and deal with British consultants 
and it is these professionals who would then negotiate contract terms and fees. 
Once agreed, the projects would also generally remain in the hands of home-
country partners. In effect, these partners ‘owned’ the transnational projects 
(and client relationships) they developed and always strove to retain control 
over them since – as is generally the case in PSFs (Pinnington & Morris, 2003) 
– projects were the source of financial rewards, prestige and power within the 
firms. Thus, being based in an advanced economy and, in particular, London, 
one of the world’s major ‘global cities’ (Sassen, 1991) where a great 
proportion of the world’s Fortune Global 500 companies are headquartered, 
the UK subsidiaries found themselves in charge of numerous transnational 
projects. And in so being, they had a strong interest in enforcing ‘global’ 
standards/methods, the absence of which would not only make transnational 
project delivery difficult but also jeopardize relations and future business with 
highly important clients. One partner put is as follows: 
You have to build global standards. You have to be quite strict with global 
processes and global methodologies. I mean our clients are international 
so if somebody screws up a project in Spain, you’ll find it very hard to 
sell a project in the UK because the Spanish have screwed it out and the 
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English will say ‘we heard that the Spanish project wasn’t very good’. So 
you have to make sure that your quality is consistent. (A2) 
 
The UK subsidiaries not only contributed to building ‘global’ 
standards/methods, they also spent a great deal of time monitoring the day-to-
day activities and practices of overseas consultants involved in the delivery of 
transnational projects to ensure such standards were adhered to. UK-based 
global partners (and their immediate subordinates) engaged in a great deal of 
communication with satellite teams and tended to spend their time, as several 
interviewees put it, ‘in airplanes’ travelling overseas to monitor the work of 
such teams. One global partner explained that: 
This is about 80% of what I do. I speak every day to, or exchange emails 
with, at least one or two of the teams. I also, at a regional level, go 
physically to the region quite frequently. I also spend a lot of time on 
conference calls with my local teams, the regional team, plus the 
managers of the businesses on the client side. So there is quite a lot of 
contact on a lot of different levels. (B2) 
 
Thus, in many ways, the UK subsidiaries were part of the ‘center’ as 
opposed to simply being ‘subsidiary’ actors. They did not merely respond to 
central requirements; they actually themselves sought to regulate the rest of 
the firm. In this sense, the four firms were characterized by a polycentric 
control context rather than a monocentric one – their international operations 
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were controlled from not one but several centers. Such a context inevitably 
created a degree of center-subsidiary convergence within the firms: it 
produced a shared interest in global control systems and also invited 
subsidiary participation in their development, thereby avoiding the pitfalls of 
‘top-down’ control. This then explains why, from the perspective of UK 
subsidiary actors, center-subsidiary divergence was something that applied 
more to other subsidiaries than to themselves.  
   
4.2. Horizontal misalignments 
The finding that the UK subsidiaries of the four firms operated more as 
‘centers’ than as subsidiaries led us to probe into how they delivered their 
projects in practice. The clear response was that they assembled transnational 
teams under the leadership of global partners, as discussed above. However, in 
practice, the process did not always fulfil its purpose. As one partner put it, 
‘the lead client service partner is the person who has overall responsibility 
globally for the service of an account and that person has the power to 
command the global organization. Now that doesn’t always work’ (C3). The 
interviews revealed two sets of problems, which we discuss in turn. 
 
Inconsistent service standards. One major problem was the continued 
presence of inconsistent standards across subsidiaries. As one manager put it, 
‘being part of a global network is hard work because people in different 
countries can have different standards. So you got quality issues. That’s the 
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major problem I think’ (C11). The interviewees explained that some overseas 
consultants did not have the ‘right’ consulting skills and that they did not work 
to the same quality standards. In particular, they tended to describe consultants 
outside North America and Western Europe as being sometimes ‘not very 
good’, as not always able to match their standards. The overall result is that 
overseas consultants, especially those based in emerging markets, were seen to 
be behaving in ways that undermined efforts to serve clients consistently 
across countries. One senior manager put it as follows:  
The problem is that they sometimes don’t measure up to our high 
standards and this is a problem from the client’s point of view because we 
can’t offer them [the client] an excellent service here and then let them 
down elsewhere. (C9) 
 
Thus, despite major centrally-driven efforts to address the problem, 
significant standard differentials continued to characterize the firms. Some 
interviewees reduced the issue to enduring cross-country differences in 
education systems. Others viewed the problem as resulting from insufficient 
investments in internal training and other activities aimed at diffusing ‘global’ 
standards (e.g. inter-subsidiary networking and staff transfers). Some put it in 
terms of professional autonomy. As an associate partner baldly stated, 
‘consultants want to do their own thing; however much you tell them they will 
go and do their own thing’ (B6).  
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Whatever the ultimate cause, the resulting problem was found to be a 
major concern for the UK subsidiaries because it undermined their ability to 
maintain consistent standards across countries and thereby to fulfil their 
promise to offer the same level of service to clients wherever these might be 
located around the world. The interviewees were particularly worried about 
the lack of suitably qualified professionals in fast growing economies such as 
China. One associate partner explained that in this country they were ‘finding 
it very hard to get the right people’ (A5). He went on to explain how, in 
particular, he was planning to dispatch a UK member of staff to manage client 
service in China: ‘We’ll probably end up getting someone from the UK to go 
over to Beijing to go look after [Client X]’ (A5).  
 
Conflicting financial interests. The ability of the UK subsidiaries to deliver 
their transnational projects was further undermined by conflicting financial 
interests within the firms. The interviews revealed that the firms, in spite of 
their self-portrayal as integrated global organizations, were structured along 
competing local profit centers (cf. Author, 2009; Fenton & Pettigrew, 2003). 
In this context, consultants (both partners and those below them) were 
expected to contribute to the success of their respective profit centers; their 
financial rewards and career progress depended on fulfilling such 
expectations. One implication is that global partners tended to allocate as 
many home-country consultants as possible to their own projects in order to 
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secure a maximum of revenue for their home office. In the words of one 
manager:  
There is always this pulling in your own guys to sell the job because you 
get credit from your home organization, credit around the utilization, 
keeping your guys busy, keeping your revenues up – all those sorts of 
issues. (D10) 
 
Partners knew that if they were to maximize their profit they had to 
minimize their dependence on overseas offices. As a consequence, the amount 
of ‘billable work’ that could be assigned to overseas offices would often be 
limited. The fact that clients always sought to manage project fees downward 
was felt to further exacerbate the problem. In this context, overseas offices 
tended to resist releasing their consultants to work on foreign-owned 
transnational projects, preferring instead to use such resources on domestic 
projects and new business development opportunities.  
 
The interviewees explained that this problem could, in some instances, be 
resolved thanks to a general commitment to norms of reciprocity within the 
firms (cf. Greenwood et al., 2010). That is, UK partners would sometime 
manage to obtain staff from overseas offices by promising to assist them in the 
future should they require UK consultants on their own transnational projects. 
But such norms were often broken in actual practice, as demonstrated by the 
following example: 
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We would like to do more work in the US with [British Bank] but [British 
Bank] in the US is a small name. It is a 20
th
 size investment bank; it is 
piddly small. So the priority of the US practice to go and work in [British 
Bank] in the US is tiny. They are not interested. It is like a second-rate 
outfit. So in the US resources would go to [US Bank], because they are 
the big boys and why would they send out big cheeses after the small 
stuff? But for us, it is a massively important account. So strategically 
positioning with them in the US would be very important; yet the appetite 
of our office there to work with them, because of where they are in the 
league table in that country, is not high: ‘If you want it you can come over 
and do it; send some people over.’ (B4) 
 
In particular, norms of reciprocity were difficult to uphold in relation to 
subsidiaries located in nations in which few or no Fortune Global 500 
corporations were located since these ‘peripheral’ units had few, if any, global 
clients to service abroad. Further, the interviewees explained that partners 
based in peripheral subsidiaries strongly resisted committing resources to 
transnational projects because they tended to receive relatively little financial 
compensation in return for their participation (cf. Rose & Hinings, 1999, p. 
46). One partner gave the following example: 
I have got 80 offices around the world and a lot of the businesses are tiny 
and so it is a tiny piece and, yes, it is big in London but it’s not in Taiwan; 
and what do they care about what we think? The issue about ‘it’s a small 
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country, it’s a small fee: I don’t care if it’s a big client’ always comes in 
the way. (C1) 
 
This finding resonates with Barrett et al.’s observation, in the context of 
an audit firm, that peripheral offices ‘were at the “end of the line”, picking up 
the crumbs of revenue and profit permitted by more central partners’ (2005, p. 
20). Further complicating this problem was the fact that peripheral offices 
often lacked suitably qualified professionals, as noted above, and therefore 
tended to prefer using their best consultants on domestic opportunities. 
Domestic opportunities were the source of more profit and potential repeat 
business, and also easier to work on given the absence of foreign-based central 
control and cultural and language differences.  
 
These inter-subsidiary struggles constituted another source of concern for 
the UK subsidiaries because they undercut their ability to assemble teams 
capable of tailoring services to suit local market and institutional conditions – 
an increasingly important criterion by which client MNEs selected their 
consulting providers. Indeed, a few interviewees reported that clients were 
becoming increasingly suspicious of claims made by consulting firms in 
relation to their global-team capabilities, as demonstrated by the following 
quote from a manager who recounted his experience during a ‘beauty contest’: 
They very openly challenged us: ‘how well can you actually put together 
a genuinely global team to support us because we suspect and believe that 
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you [D-Consulting] are not geared up to work globally... [C]onvince us 
that you can work globally’. (D11) 
 
5. Discussion & Conclusions 
Our analysis shows that GPSFs, in endeavoring to provide integrated cross-
national services to global clients, are becoming subject to a center-subsidiary 
tension similar to that identified in more conventional MNEs. The key 
problem is the service standards expected from the center are not always met 
at the local level and the center-subsidiary cooperation needed to assemble 
effective global service teams is often undermined by conflicting financial 
interests. The firms are seeking to rectify the problem by increasing central 
control (culturally and bureaucratically) but the process is thwarted by the 
local interests, practices and wider contextual circumstances of subsidiaries. 
That said, our analysis also shows that the center-subsidiary tension manifests 
itself somewhat differently in GPSFs: it occurs not only between headquarters 
and subsidiaries, as typically understood in the socio-political view of the 
MNE, but also between subsidiaries themselves and, in particular, between 
what may be called or ‘core’ subsidiaries and ‘peripheral’ ones.  
 
Key to understanding this difference is the confluence of three factors: (1) 
the  nature of the professional task, which decentralizes control over key 
value-generating assets such as client relationships; (2) the embeddedness of 
certain subsidiaries in core economies that are home to the world’s most 
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significant MNEs and that, as a result, facilitate the development of 
subsidiary-controlled transnational client projects; and (3) the demand for 
integrated cross-national services on the part of global clients, which compel 
such subsidiaries to actively engage in and, indeed, lead central control efforts. 
Taken together, these three factors give rise to a polycentric control context 
(i.e. one in which central control emanates from not only headquarters but also 
core subsidiaries) that, in turn, leads to the center-subsidiary tension taking on 
both vertical (headquarters-subsidiary) and horizontal (inter-subsidiary) 
dimensions and, in particular, expressing itself along core-periphery lines.  
 
Our analysis has several research implications. First, it advances socio-
political studies of the MNE by underscoring the importance of sectoral 
influences on center-subsidiary control dynamics. Whilst it has already been 
suggested that service MNEs might face different organizational challenges 
from their manufacturing counterparts (e.g. Aharoni, 1996; Campbell & 
Verbeke, 1994), few systematic studies have sought to explore how this may 
be so at the level of the center-subsidiary control relation. Miozzo & Yamin’s 
(2012) study is a rare exception in this regard. We agree with the authors that 
global clients are a major determinant of such a relation in the services sector; 
that these clients pressurize their service providers to be better coordinated 
and, as a consequence, to increase central control. However, our study shows 
that, in the professional services sector, global client relationships are 
controlled and managed by not only headquarters but also – depending on the 
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nationality of the client – ‘core’ subsidiaries and that, as a result, central 
control emanates from the latter, not just the former. Our analysis thus calls for 
a view of the MNE as a polycentric control structure rather than a monocentric 
one and highlights the need to distinguish between ‘core’ (controlling) and 
‘peripheral’ (controlled) subsidiaries in analyzing center-subsidiary control 
relations. 
 
Our analysis also contributes to developing the emerging body of 
specialist research on the international organization of GPSFs. It does so in 
three ways. First, it shows that, as in the case of MNEs in general, GPSFs are 
finding it difficult to develop integrated organizational structures. Ferner et al. 
(1995) observed this very problem two decades ago in the context of one of 
the then ‘Big Six’ accountancies, arguing that the firm’s corporate ‘glue’ was 
‘coming unstuck’ just as its global clients were calling for greater integration. 
Our analysis shows that the problem is also present in consulting firms and 
that it has not gone away despite major global control efforts in the last two 
decades. This highlights the need to move beyond a view of the GPSF as an 
organizational design rationally articulated by the center, as suggested – 
implicitly at least – by much of the relevant literature (e.g. Greenwood et al., 
2010; Segal-Horn & Dean, 2009; also Breunig et al., 2014) towards one as a 
socio-political space. 
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This is not to suggest that no center-subsidiary integration is occurring in 
GPSFs, that the firms are simply loosely coupled federations with no 
coordination capabilities. Rather (and this constitutes another implication of 
our analysis for GPSF-focused research), there are varied levels of integration 
within them. As Barrett et al.’s (2005) study of ‘Big Four’ accountancies 
highlighted a decade ago, there are ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ units in GPSFs – the 
former share an interest in serving ‘global’ clients across nations whilst the 
latter are more focused on ‘local’ clients. Our analysis reinforces this point 
with reference to consultancies and also shows how this reality produces a 
degree of center-subsidiary convergence around the need for shared control 
systems within the firm’s ‘core’ while at the same time creating misalignments 
between this part of the organization and subsidiaries based in the rest of the 
world – the ‘periphery’. Further, our analysis also shows that even within the 
‘core’, integration is by no means a ‘done deal’, for whilst there are pressures 
on core subsidiaries to develop shared control systems, there are also 
countervailing pressures at work. Thus, our study calls for a more 
differentiated understanding of control in GPSFs, one that can appreciate the 
polycentric nature of such control and do justice to the complex center-
subsidiary relations accompanying it.  
 
Finally, our analysis highlights the importance of expanding our 
understanding of the sources of tension in the center-subsidiary control 
relation. Building on earlier work (Author, 2009), it shows that underpinning 
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such a tension are not only different conceptions of professional practice and 
traditional issues of control vs. autonomy, as understood in previous GPSF-
specific studies (e.g., Faulconbridge & Muzio, 2013) and the socio-political 
view of the MNE more generally, but also divergent economic interests in the 
context of a decentralized organizational system and an uneven world 
political-economy. We agree with Spence et al. (in press) that the profit 
motive is crucial to GPSFs, that the interests of different parts of the firm 
converge on the need to maximize revenue generation, but also show that this 
very reality, paradoxically, is as much a source of disintegration as it is a 
source of integration. This is because the firms are, ultimately, not unified 
financial structures – they operate as collections of semi-autonomous profit 
centers, each striving for local profit maximization through optimal resource 
utilization (cf. Fenton & Pettigrew, 2003). In this context, local units do 
indeed share an interest in ‘making as much money as possible’ (Spence et al., 
in press, p. 19) but they do not share the same pot of money and therefore 
clash over central control efforts when these threaten local financial 
performance. Including these dynamics into our understanding of control in 
GPSFs is thus crucial and, ultimately, as Morgan (2011, p. 433) puts it, ‘takes 
us to the heart of the relationship between capitalism, MNCs and institutional 
contexts.’  
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5.1. Managerial Implications 
This study also has a number of managerial implications. It shows that GPSFs 
are finding themselves overextended – they are struggling both to control the 
quality of their service around the world, especially in emerging markets, and 
to facilitate the level of inter-office cooperation needed to assemble 
transnational teams capable of delivering such service across nations. GPSF 
leaders and managers cannot afford to be complacent about such a reality – 
they risk not only endangering their ‘elite’ status but also being ‘accused of 
behaving like twenty-first century imperialists, imposing the exploits of their 
homeland on malleable markets worldwide’ (Doz et al., 2001, p. 3) and re-
producing the core-periphery inequalities that Western colonialism has 
engendered. Nor can they simply assume that increased central control will 
deal with the problem; it may in fact worsen it and also undermine the very 
advantages of decentralization, i.e. local responsiveness, entrepreneurialism 
and innovation. 
 
Against this background, GPSF leaders need to meet two imperatives. 
First, they should work towards developing truly global standards. They must 
face up to the fact that their ‘global’ standards are not genuinely global and 
appreciate that imposing these on a worldwide basis will inevitably produce, 
wittingly or unwittingly, a degree of resistance and hybridization at the local 
level. Increasing central control (through e.g. training and direct supervision) 
to address this can only be part of the solution; a more ‘bottom-up’ approach 
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to the problem is likely produce better results. In this sense, the firms must 
return to their roots as consensually managed organizations, not become 
command-and-control structures. Second, more effort should be put into 
creating unified reward and recognition systems. The firms cannot, on the one 
hand, preach the virtues of transnational cooperation and, on the other, tolerate 
structures that produce inter-office competition and inequality. The problem is 
complex but a logical solution would be to sever the link between ‘global’ 
client relationships and ‘core’ offices, and manage work and rewards related to 
such relationships in a truly global manner, i.e. independently of the national 
borders across which the firms operate. This is likely to be very challenging – 
not least because doing so would threaten the wealth and power of ‘core’ 
offices – but it would help in aligning ‘global firm’ rhetoric with practice. It 
may also serve, perhaps indirectly, to address the service quality problem by 
increasing the motivation of employees around the world to work to the same 
standards.  
 
5.2. Limitations and possible areas of further research 
As with any study, ours is not without limitations and these may be addressed 
by way of future research. First, the UK subsidiary perspective taken in the 
study inevitably limits the investigation. Multi-site research would be very 
useful in this regard. In addition, the study’s focus on a single professional 
services sector – management/IT consulting – inevitably limits the 
generalizability of its conclusions. PSF scholars (e.g. Malhotra & Morris, 
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2009; Suddaby et al., 2008) are increasingly stressing that even though PSFs 
share many similar characteristics they cannot be treated as a unified 
organizational category. Thus, the extent to which firms operating in other 
professional sectors (e.g. accounting, engineering and law) exhibit the 
dynamics observed in this study remains to be assessed.  
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i
 The extent to which this particular control model is applied in practice is likely to vary 
depending on a number of factors, including mode of governance (e.g. partnership vs. 
corporation) and type of profession (e.g. auditing vs. consulting) (see Malhortra & Morris, 
2009) but, on the whole, GPSFs are generally believed to be less centrally controlled and, in 
particular, less reliant on ‘bureaucratic’ management systems than conventional MNEs.  
ii
 The first three firms had all been organized as networks of local firms before becoming 
publicly-listed corporations in the 2000s (through mergers with corporations, in the case of 
two firms, and an initial public offering, in the case of one firm).   
iii
 The ‘Borg’ appears in Star Trek: The Next Generation, depicting a type of cyborg that 
ruthlessly seeks to incorporate all life forms into itself. Its slogan is ‘Resistance is futile. You 
will be assimilated.’ 
